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Abstract: Moderate scientism is the view that empirical science can help answer 
questions in nonscientific disciplines. In this paper, we evaluate moderate scientism in 
philosophy. We review several ways that science has contributed to research in 
epistemology, action theory, ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. We 
also review several ways that science has contributed to our understanding of how 
philosophers make judgments and decisions. Based on this research, we conclude that the 
case for moderate philosophical scientism is strong: scientific practice has promoted 
significant progress in philosophy and its further development should be welcomed and 
encouraged. 
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1. Introduction 
Scientism comes in many varieties (Stenmark 1997; Peels, this volume). One radical 
version of scientism is the view that science is the only way to acquire knowledge about 
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reality (cf. Trigg 1993, p. 90; Rosenberg, this volume). Although radical scientism is a 
coherent view, it is either clearly false or trivial. On the one hand, many organisms gain 
knowledge about reality but are incapable of practicing science, in any recognizable 
sense of that phrase, in which case radical scientism is false. The list includes human 
infants, dolphins, snakes, frogs, sharks, octopi, spiders, and many others. On the other 
hand, suppose that “(practicing) science” is understood so loosely as to count these 
organisms as scientific practitioners. In that case, any way of knowing counts, by 
stipulation, as “science,” and radical scientism becomes trivial and uninteresting. 
 A less radical version of scientism is the view that science is a good way of 
answering any evaluable question (see also Radnitzky 1978, p 1008; Atkins 1995). The 
plausibility of this view depends mainly on what counts as practicing science and what 
makes for a good way to answer a question. For example, suppose your friend asks 
whether you heard what he just said. This is an evaluable — and in some contexts 
important — question. You immediately say, “Yes,” because it is fresh in your memory. 
Given the relative efficiency of simply relying on memory, it would be bad to instead 
respond by practicing science. To take another example, suppose your partner asks 
whether you still love them. It would be bad to begin evaluating the hypothesis “I still 
love you” via the scientific method. Of course, if simply relying on memory or attending 
to one’s feelings counts as practicing science, then this version of scientism also becomes 
trivial and uninteresting. 
In this chapter, we will defend a more moderate claim concerning science: 
moderate scientism. Moderate scientism is the view that science can help answer 
questions in disciplines typically thought to fall outside of science. (This is very similar 
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to what Stenmark (2004) calls “scientific expansionism,” according to which “the 
boundaries of science can and should be expanded in such a way that something that has 
not been understood as science can now become a part of science” (Stenmark 2004, pp. 
xi–xii). Stenmark also calls this view “scientism” (Stenmark 2004, p. xii; see also 
Stenmark 2000).) As a proof of concept for moderate scientism, we will examine the role 
that empirical science has played in a discipline often perceived as far removed from 
empirical science: philosophy. 
When practicing their trade, philosophers often appeal to ordinary usage of words 
and patterns of judgment or behavior. The basic assumption behind this approach is that 
patterns in ordinary thought and talk — at least about categories central to social 
cognition, such as knowledge, morality, belief, assertion, or freedom — can be used as 
evidence for philosophical theories of important categories. This approach is common 
throughout the history of philosophy. Aristotle, for instance, defended this approach 
when he wrote that one way to gather evidence in philosophy was to find a balance 
between different views about a philosophical topic “in the light not only of our 
conclusion and our premises, but also of what is commonly said about it” (Aristotle 350 
BCE/1941, 1098b, 9-11). Thomas Reid thought, “Philosophy has no other root but the 
principles of Common Sense,” and that “severed from this root, its honours wither, its sap 
is dried up, it dies and rots” (Reid 1764/1997, p. 19). The approach remains popular 
today. For example, J.L. Austin advised that “ordinary language” should get “the first 
word” in philosophical theorizing (Austin 1956, p. 11). Wilfrid Sellars argued that 
identifying the defining features of ordinary thought — “the manifest image” — is “a 
task of the first importance” for philosophers (Sellars 1963, ch. 1). And David Lewis 
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warned, “When common sense delivers a firm and uncontroversial answer about a not-
too-far-fetched case, theory had better agree” (Lewis 1986, p. 194). 
To characterize ordinary thought and talk, philosophers often draw on their own 
experiences, social observation, and reflections about what we would say about certain 
situations (Ducasse 1941, ch. 10; Fodor 1964; Jackson 1998, ch. 2). Seminal 
philosophical work has relied on this kind of introspection and social observation, which 
is a natural place to start (e.g. Locke 1690/1975, bk. 4.11.3-8; MacIver 1938; 
Wittgenstein 1975). Indeed, we find it such a natural place to start that we ourselves have 
written papers contributing such observations to the literature (e.g. Buckwalter and Turri 
2014). However, this method of gathering evidence is limited and in some cases has 
mischaracterized ordinary thought and talk (for recent reviews see Blouw, Buckwalter, 
and Turri Forthcoming; Turri Forthcoming-a, Forthcoming-b). 
In the remainder of this paper, we review several ways that empirical science has 
helped philosophers accurately represent ordinary thought and talk. Experimental, 
observational and statistical techniques have significantly contributed to research in 
epistemology, action theory, ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. We 
also review several ways that empirical science has contributed to our understanding of 
the judgments and decisions of professional philosophers themselves. Based on this 
research, we conclude that the case for moderate philosophical scientism is very strong: 
science has promoted significant progress in philosophy and its further development 
should be welcomed and encouraged. 
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2. Epistemology: Direct and Indirect effects 
A major debate in contemporary epistemology involves the influence that stakes have on 
knowledge attribution (DeRose 1992, 1995; Cohen 1999; Fantl and McGrath 2002; 
Hawthorne 2004; Stanley 2005; Fantl and McGrath 2007; DeRose 2009; Buckwalter 
2010; May, Sinnott-Armstrong, Hull, and Zimmerman 2010; Pinillos 2012; Sripada and 
Stanley 2012; Cohen 2013; Buckwalter and Schaffer 2015). Many philosophers claim 
that ordinarily whether we attribute knowledge depends on how much is at stake or the 
consequences of error. In support of this claim, philosophers ask us to consider our 
intuitive reactions to pairs of cases that vary the stakes while stipulating that (something 
like) a “justified true belief” is held fixed. If knowledge attribution seems to vary along 
with stakes, then this is interpreted as important data to be accounted for by 
epistemological theory. For instance, some philosophers interpret this as “evidence of the 
very best type” that “knows” is a semantically context-sensitive expression (DeRose 
2009, p. 81), while others interpret this as evidence that how much is at stake is part of 
what “makes true belief into knowledge” (Stanley 2005, p. 2). 
One limitation of this research is that it often proceeds by explicitly stipulating 
some crucial details of the scenarios. But this does not correspond to the way people 
ordinarily make such attributions. Ordinarily people must decide these things for 
themselves in the context of a knowledge judgment. This raises questions about the 
ecological validity of judgments about the cases, and whether findings from them 
generalize to situations in which knowledge judgments naturally occur. Moreover, 
researchers stipulate crucial details without taking sufficient precautions to prevent other 
details of the case from interfering with the stipulations. This is potentially important 
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because recent research shows that many social evaluations, including the attribution of 
mental states like belief and knowledge, can occur implicitly and automatically (Bargh, 
Schwader, Hailey, Dyer, and Boothby 2012). 
Another limitation of this research is that it features cases containing too many 
variables for introspection or social observation to reasonably track. For instance, in one 
influential exposition, readers are asked to sequentially consider five permutations on a 
single case, varying between approximately 100-150 words each (Stanley 2005, pp. 3-5). 
An optimal approach would not only keep track of all the variables but also estimate their 
interactions with each other and the cumulative impact that this has on knowledge 
attribution. Social and cognitive scientists have developed tools that can accomplish this. 
Combined with randomized assignment in a properly controlled experiment, statistical 
techniques ranging from basic regression to causal path analysis can be used to discern 
complex and unexpected relationships among variables (Chickering 2003; Iacobucci, 
Saldanha, and Deng 2007; Hayes 2013). For instance, such techniques can be used to 
evaluate whether varying stakes affects knowledge attribution and, if so, whether the 
affect is direct or indirect (i.e. mediated by other variables). These tools can also evaluate 
the relative strength of these effects and the overall contribution that they make in 
predicting knowledge attribution. 
 For precisely these reasons, researchers recently used these tools to study 
knowledge attributions (Turri, Buckwalter, and Rose 2015; Turri and Buckwalter 2015).   
They randomly assigned participants to consider one of two minimally-matched scenarios 
that varied the stakes. The construction of these scenarios was guided by prior empirical 
work from the judgment and decision-making literature, which identified several factors 
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that influence the perception of stakes (Beach and Mitchell 1978; McAllister, Mitchell, 
and Beach 1979). And instead of stipulating matters typically considered obvious or 
crucial for knowledge, researchers had the participants judge those matters for 
themselves, alongside judging whether the agent had knowledge. 
Here is one pair of cases involving a protagonist who must make a decision in a 
low-stakes context (submitting a provisional report about whether an individual is 
“jogging” and on “a low-carb diet”) or a high-stakes (submitting a final report about 
whether the individual is a “threat” and “selling arms to terrorists”): 
Jennifer is an intelligence analyst developing a file on Ivan, an elusive foreign 
operative. Jennifer has a source who tells her that Ivan stopped [his low-carb 
diet/selling arms to terrorists] and is no longer [jogging regularly/a threat]. 
Jennifer must submit a [provisional/final] report on Ivan to her supervisor within 
the hour. She will [definitely/definitely not] have a chance to revise her 
[provisional/final] report, and she [will not/will] be held accountable for decisions 
based on her [provisional/final] report. 
After seeing either a low-stakes or a high-stakes case, participants judged the 
important details of the case for themselves. More specifically, they were asked to rate 
their agreement with these attributions: 
1. Jennifer thinks that Ivan no longer [jogs regularly/is a threat]. 
2. It’s true that Ivan no longer [jogs regularly/is a threat]. 
3. Jennifer has good evidence that Ivan no longer [jogs regularly/is a threat]. 
4. Jennifer should write in the report that Ivan no longer [jogs regularly/is a threat]. 
5. Jennifer knows that Ivan no longer [jogs regularly/is a threat]. 
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When researchers tested these cases on hundreds of participants, they found that 
stakes affected knowledge attributions (Turri, Buckwalter, and Rose 2015: Experiment 
1). People were more likely to attribute knowledge in a low-stakes case than in a high-
stakes case. In order to ascertain how stakes affected knowledge attribution, researchers 
used causal path analysis to model the relationships among stakes (the independent 
variable in this experimental design) and the five dependent variables (the five judgments 
that participants made about Jennifer’s situation). On the best fitting causal model, stakes 
directly affected judgments about how Jennifer should act, and these judgments in turn 
directly caused judgments of what she knew. These results provide evidence that 
powerfully vindicates certain theoretical hypotheses about the connection between 
knowledge and action (e.g. James 1879/1948; Fantl and McGrath 2009), with a level of 
detail and precision unattainable without the tools of empirical science. 
3. Ethics: Ought Implies Can 
A longstanding assumption in moral philosophy is that obligations entail the ability to 
fulfill them, typically glossed with the slogan “ought implies can.” According to this 
principle, an agent is not morally obligated to act if she is unable to do so. Many 
contemporary philosophers endorse this principle (Moore 1922; Hare 1963; Van Fraassen 
1973; Dahl 1974; Feldman 1986; Flanagan 1991; Zimmerman 1993; Streumer 2003; 
Howard-Snyder 2006; Vranas 2007; Copp 2008; Littlejohn 2012). Agreement on ought-
implies-can is so widespread that direct arguments for it are rarely articulated (as 
observed by Stocker 1971, p. 303). When arguments do appear for the principle, they 
often appeal to judgments about particular thought experiments, intuitions about ordinary 
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usage, and claims to the effect that “ought implies can” is a core principle of 
commonsense moral cognition (Moore 1922, p. 317). 
 But not all philosophers endorse ought implies can without reservation. Some 
claim that the principle is “only partially correct” (Stocker 1971, p. 303) or that “ought” 
only pragmatically conversationally implicates “can” (Sinnott-Armstrong 1984). A 
handful of philosophers have even rejected the principle outright (Ryan 2003; Graham 
2011). Critics frequently rely on intuitions about thought experiments. For example, they 
often ask us to imagine agents with various “psychological compulsions” such as 
kleptomania or addiction. If agents in these cases have an obligation to stop stealing or 
smoking but are unable to do so, then ought implies can is false (Blum 2000; Ryan 2003). 
Still others have constructed complex and imaginative thought experiments (Frankfurt 
1969; Fischer 2003) or cases hinging on other decisive moral principles (Graham 2011) 
in an attempt to prime intuitions and arrive at a compelling counterexample. In response, 
champions of ought implies can have claimed that is “easy to deny” that these scenarios 
are genuine counterexamples (Graham 2011, p. 342). 
 Given that there seems to be fundamental disagreement in the field, it is natural to 
wonder whether ought-implies-can actually is a core principle of our moral cognition. 
Researchers recently set out to investigate this question experimentally (Buckwalter and 
Turri 2015). Instead of using complicated or fanciful thought experiments, they 
administered straightforward cases featuring ordinary agents with uncontroversial moral 
obligations frequently encountered in everyday life. When several simple and 
straightforward cases were tested on hundreds of participants, the overwhelming majority 
of people attributed moral obligations but denied the ability to fulfill them. In other 
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words, the result was that commonsense moral cognition utterly rejects ought-implies-
can. 
In one experiment, for instance, researchers presented participants with this basic 
scenario about an innocent bystander named Michael: 
Michael is relaxing in the park when he sees a small girl fall into a nearby pond. 
She is drowning and definitely will die unless someone quickly pulls her out. This 
part of the park is secluded and Michael is the only person around. 
After seeing this scenario, participants saw one of two endings to the story that 
manipulated the protagonist’s ability. In the unable condition, the protagonist was 
physically unable to act: 
But Michael is stricken with a sudden paralysis in his legs and cannot swim to 
save the girl. As a result, Michael is not physically able to save the girl. 
While in the able condition, the protagonist was physically able to act: 
And Michael is a normal adult male and can swim fast enough to save the girl. As 
a result, Michael is physically able to save the girl. 
After seeing one of these cases, participants were asked to select the best option that 
applies from the list of options below concerning moral obligation and ability: 
1. Michael is morally obligated to save the girl, and Michael is physically able to do 
so. 
2. Michael is morally obligated to save the girl, but Michael is not physically able to 
do so. 
3. Michael is not morally obligated to save the girl, but Michael is physically able to 
do so. 
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4. Michael is not morally obligated to save the girl, and Michael is not physically 
able to do so. 
If ought implies can is a central principle of moral cognition, then when people consider 
which option best applies to Michael, we would expect them to answer very differently 
depending on whether Michael is able or unable to act. Specifically, participants in the 
unable condition should strongly disprefer option 2, which says that Michael has an 
obligation he is unable to fulfill. However, researchers instead found that Michael’s 
inability made no difference at all to people’s judgments about moral obligation. In both 
conditions, the overwhelming majority of participants judged that Michael was morally 
obligated despite being able or unable to act. This same basic pattern of response is 
robust across a wide variety of narrative contexts, types of inability, and manner of 
probing for moral obligation. 
4. Philosophy of Mind: Mechanisms and Concepts of Belief 
A core question in philosophy of mind concerns whether beliefs can be voluntary. 
According to doxastic voluntarism, it is possible to have the same kind of willful control 
over our beliefs as we do over of our actions. Doxastic involuntarists deny the possibility 
of controlling our beliefs this way. 
Philosophers have traditionally been split on this issue. Descartes, Augustine, 
Aquinas, Pascal, James and others have favored doxastic voluntarism. But the dominant 
view in contemporary philosophy of mind is that beliefs are involuntary (Williams 1973; 
Alston 1988; Bennett 1990; Scott-Kakures 1994; Pojman 1999). Each side has claimed 
that their preferred view is obviously correct. For example, Descartes thought that our 
ability to voluntarily control belief was “so obvious” that “it must be regarded as one of 
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the first and most common notions that are innate in us” (Descartes 1644/1985, §39). 
Doxastic involuntarists respond that the notion of voluntary belief-formation is absurd, 
“chokingly unswallowable” (Bennett 1990, p. 90), or obviously impossible “as a 
conceptual matter” (Scott-Kakures 1994, p. 96).  
Science is relevant to this debate in two important ways. First, cognitive science is 
best positioned to investigate the human mind’s powers, including whether it is capable 
of forming beliefs at will. If belief-formation was found to be, say, insensitive to 
experimental interventions on willpower or volitions, then it would support 
involuntarism. By contrast, if belief-formation was found to be directly sensitive to such 
interventions, then it would support voluntarism. Recent evidence suggests that basic 
physiological processes, such as heart rate, are subject to voluntary control (Lehrer, 
Sasaki, and Saito 1999), but we are unaware of any related research on belief-formation. 
Nevertheless, if something as basic as cardiac rhythm is open to some degree of 
voluntary control, then it would not be surprising if belief-formation was too (compare 
Naylor 1985) 
Second, science can help evaluate whether the ordinary concept of belief rules out 
voluntarism. Initially, this would involve a simple experiment randomly assigning people 
to assess one of two minimally-matched scenarios. Minimally matched scenarios differ 
from one in another only with respect to the variable of interest their comparison is 
intended to test. One group reads a scenario in which an agent professes to choose to 
form a certain belief, and the other group reads a scenario in which the agent does not do 
this. Then participants rate whether the agent believes the relevant proposition. If 
voluntary belief-formation is conceptually impossible, then we would expect no 
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difference in belief-attribution across the two conditions. As it turns out, this experiment 
has already been done (Turri, Rose, and Buckwalter 2015). The agent’s professed choice 
to believe (or disbelieve) the proposition had an extremely large effect on whether 
participants attributed belief to him. When the agent professed to choose to believe the 
proposition, participants attributed the belief to him. When the agent professed to refuse 
to believe the proposition, participants did not attribute the belief to him. Follow-up 
studies revealed that this same basic pattern persists across different narrative contexts 
and ways of probing for belief-attribution, that belief-attribution was affected by 
interventions on the agent’s perceived willpower, and that the agent’s professed volitions 
can be a much stronger cue to belief-attribution than even the agent’s evidence is. 
In one follow-up study, for instance, participants were divided into six groups. 
They each read a story about Malcolm receiving a weather report that indicated there was 
either a 5%, 50%, or 90% chance that it would rain the next day. Then participants were 
told either that Malcolm is optimistic and says, “I refuse to believe it will rain,” or that he 
is pessimistic and says, “I choose to believe it will rain.” Participants overwhelmingly 
denied belief in the optimistic condition and attributed belief in the pessimistic condition. 
By contrast, the strength of Malcolm’s probabilistic evidence (5%, 50%, or 90%) had 
only a small effect on belief-attributions. These results suggest that the ordinary concept 
of belief fully countenances the possibility of voluntary belief. Indeed, ordinary belief-
attributions can be more sensitive to the agent’s volitions than his evidence. 
5. Action Theory: Representation of Thought Experiments 
Philosophers frequently use thought experiments to generate evidence for or against 
theories. Thought experiments often feature highly fanciful situations involving complex 
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events, underspecified details, and unrealistic outcomes. For example, the following 
thought experiment was designed to test whether people intuitively judge that acting 
freely is compatible with a deterministic scenario in which perfect prediction of human 
choices is possible: 
Recent brain scanning studies have shown that specific patterns of brain activity 
can be used to predict simple decisions several seconds before people are 
consciously aware of those decisions. Imagine that in the future brain scanning 
technology becomes much more advanced. Neuroscientists can use brain scanners 
to detect all the activity in a person’s brain and use that information to predict 
with 100% accuracy every single decision a person will make before the person is 
consciously aware of their decision. The neuroscientists cannot, however, do 
anything to change brain activity and hence they cannot directly influence 
thoughts and actions. Suppose that in the future a woman named Jill agrees, as 
part of a neuroscience experiment, to wear this brain scanner for a month (it is a 
lightweight cap). The neuroscientists are able to use real-time information about 
her brain activity to predict everything that Jill will think or decide, even before 
she is aware of these thoughts or decisions. However, they cannot alter her brain 
activity to change what she thinks and does. On election day, Jill is considering 
how she will vote for President and for Governor. Before she is aware of making 
any decisions, the neuroscientists can see, based on her brain activity, that she is 
about to decide to vote for Smith for President and Green for Governor. Just as 
the neuroscientists predicted, Jill votes for Smith for President and Green for 
Governor. As with her decisions to vote for Smith for President and Green for 
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Governor, the neuroscientists are able to predict every decision Jill ends up 
making with 100% accuracy while she is wearing the scanner. Occasionally, Jill 
tries to trick the neuroscientists by changing her mind at the last second or by 
stopping herself from doing something that she just decided to do, but the 
neuroscientists predict these events as well. Indeed, these experiments confirm 
that all human mental activity is entirely based on brain activity such that 
everything that any human thinks or does could be predicted ahead of time based 
on their earlier brain activity. (Nahmias, Shepard, and Reuter 2014, p. 514) 
Some researchers found that people overwhelmingly agreed that Jill voted of her 
own free will (Nahmias et al. 2014, Experiment 1). Since it was stipulated in the thought 
experiment that “neuroscientists are able to predict every decision Jill ends up making 
with 100% accuracy,” they concluded that our concept of free will is not threatened by 
and is compatible with the future possibility of perfect neuro-predictability of human 
behavior. However, one potential worry is that people’s judgments might be due to 
misunderstood, ignored, or unspecified details that they systematically “fill in” by relying 
on background assumptions. This might be especially likely to happen when participants 
are asked to consider highly contrived and unfamiliar scenarios. 
 A properly conducted experiment can address this worry and thereby help 
philosophers discover how we would ordinarily think about or categorize Jill’s behavior 
in this scenario. For example, another group of researchers recently tested whether key 
details of the thought experiment just described were being represented when people 
agreed that Jill acted freely (Rose, Buckwalter, and Nichols 2015). They administered the 
same thought experiment verbatim but also included a series of follow-up questions. 
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Crucially, one question measured whether participants accepted that Jill’s action was 
determined. It turns out that they did not. Instead, they judged that Jill could have voted 
for a different candidate, despite the occurrence of a perfectly predictive pattern of brain 
activity to the contrary. In fact, mediation analysis suggested that ascribing free will 
actually caused people to interpret the case in a way that is inconsistent with 
determinism. These results cast doubt on the claim that such cases demonstrate that 
people are “intuitive compatibilists.” For although people attributed free will, they did not 
view the agent’s actions as determined. This result also serves as another demonstration 
of how scientific tools can be used to aid philosophical inquiry. When philosophers 
engage in thought experiments, these tools can help to estimate whether the key variable 
of interest is accompanied and informed by other philosophically relevant variables. 
6. Philosophy of Language: Assertion 
Assertion is the main way in which human beings communicate information to each 
other. An important question at the intersection of philosophy of language and 
epistemology involves the standards for assertion. What rules or norms govern when an 
assertion should be made? Some philosophers defend factive accounts of the norm. A 
factive account entails that only true assertions should be made. The most popular factive 
account is the knowledge account, which says that you should assert a proposition only if 
you know that it is true (MacIver 1938; Moore 1962; Unger 1975; Williamson 2000; 
Hawthorne 2004; Schaffer 2008; Turri 2011, 2013a; for a review, see Benton 2014). 
Many critics reject factive accounts on the charge that they do not reflect ordinary 
thought and talk associated with the social practice of assertion (e.g. Douven 2006; Hill 
and Schechter 2007; Lackey 2007; Kvanvig 2009). In place of the knowledge norm, 
  17 
critics have defended a range of non-factive accounts that base the standard for assertion 
on belief (Bach and Harnish 1979; Bach 2008) or justified belief (Douven 2006; Lackey 
2007), which do not demand that an assertion be true. These philosophers argue that non-
factive accounts better “explain” or “accommodate” “our intuitions” about assertions 
(Douven 2006; Lackey 2007). 
There is a straightforward way to test these claims about what is intuitive or 
accommodating: study how ordinary language-users evaluate assertions. When 
researchers studied this in controlled experiments, they found that truth had a profound 
effect on whether people thought an assertion should be made (Turri 2013a). In one 
study, for example, participants read a simple story about a watch collector, Maria, who 
maintains a detailed inventory of the thousands of watches she owns. Someone asks her 
whether she owns a 1990 Rolex Submariner, so she consults the inventory, which she 
knows is imperfect but extremely accurate. One group of participants saw the story 
continue in a way that made Maria’s belief about the watch true: 
And this is just another case where the inventory is exactly right: she does have 
one. 
Another group of participants saw the story continue in a way that made Maria’s belief 
false: 
But this is one of those rare cases where the inventory is wrong: she does not have 
one. 
When Maria’s belief was true, nearly all participants (97%) judged that she 
should tell her guests that she has a 1990 Rolex Submariner. But when Maria’s belief was 
false, the vast majority of participants (80%) judged that Maria should not make the 
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assertion. In other words, holding fixed the assertion’s evidential basis and changing only 
its truth-value caused an enormous shift in how people evaluated the assertion. This same 
basic pattern persisted across different narrative contexts and ways of probing for 
evaluations across several experiments. The results demonstrate that most people do not 
find factive accounts of assertion counterintuitive. Science revealed that non-factive 
accounts do not cohere well with our ordinary social practice. 
7. Methodology: Philosophical Judgments, Decision Making, and Behavior 
Science has recently begun shedding light on how professional philosophers make 
decisions about important questions. One group of studies pertains to whether 
philosophers are susceptible to well-known cognitive biases (Jones and Nisbett 1971; 
Tversky and Kahneman 1974) when reasoning about philosophical matters. The main 
finding here is that professional philosophers are equally susceptible to these biases as 
other people. For example, professional philosophers are susceptible to order effects 
when making philosophical judgments about cases (Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg 
2008; Liao, Wiegmann, Alexander, and Vong 2012; Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2012, 
Forthcoming). Professional philosophers also exhibit framing effects, such as whether a 
scenario is considered from the perspective of an actor or an observer (Tobia, Chapman, 
and Stich 2013; Tobia, Buckwalter, and Stich 2013), or whether salient features are 
described in terms of a gain or a loss (Schwitzgebel and Cushman Forthcoming). 
 Another group of studies pertains to how individual differences affect 
professional philosophers’ judgments. For example, researchers have found that heritable 
personality traits such as extraversion or emotional stability correlate with judgments 
about free will and moral responsibility in lay populations (Feltz and Cokely 2009; Feltz 
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2013), and that this may also be true to some extent of professionals (Schultz, Cokely, 
and Feltz 2011). Researchers in experimental epistemology have argued that intuitions 
among professional philosophers about knowledge may be influenced by their native 
language (Vaesen, Peterson, and Van Bezooijen 2013). Research has also suggested that 
intuitions about the reference of proper names vary according to academic areas of 
specialization within philosophy and linguistics (Machery 2012) as well as across 
western and east Asian cultures (Machery, Olivola, and Blanc 2009; Sytsma, Livengood, 
Sato, and Oguchi 2015). At the same time, researchers have also found evidence that 
some philosophical intuitions may be shared by individuals across many different 
cultures, which some have argued is essential for understanding their evidential 
significance (Turri 2013b; Kim and Yuan 2015; Machery et al. Forthcoming). 
A related but distinct line of research investigates how specialization in 
philosophy impacts the behaviors of professional philosophers in their daily lives. This 
work has mainly examined whether training in ethics encourages moral and other pro-
social behavior such as answering student emails, voting, staying in touch with one’s 
mother, or being considerate to others in various ways at professional conferences 
(Schwitzgebel 2009; Schwitzgebel and Rust 2009, 2010; Schwitzgebel, Rust, Huang, 
Moore, and Coates 2011; Rust and Schwitzgebel 2013; Schwitzgebel and Rust 2013). 
Researchers have found little if any evidence professional training in ethics promotes 
better behavior. The results of one recent meta-analysis found no difference between 
ethicists and non-ethicists, despite including over 18,000 individual observations across 
18 different measures of behavior (Schwitzgebel and Rust Forthcoming). 
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8. Conclusion 
Moderate scientism is the view that science can help answer questions in disciplines 
typically thought to fall outside of science. In good scientific spirit, we have approached 
moderate scientism as a hypothesis to be evaluated in light of existing evidence. 
As a case study, we reviewed a range of recent scientific work focused 
specifically on questions of longstanding philosophical interest, and on the judgments and 
behavior of professional philosophers themselves. In each case, scientific research 
deepened our understanding of the underlying issues and advanced the debate. For 
example, when it comes to assessing the relationship between stakes and knowledge 
attributions, advanced statistical techniques produced a clear and testable model of a 
complex set of variables, which even the most astute introspection or observation is 
helpless to evaluate when unaided by the tools of cognitive and social science. Behavioral 
experiments showed that commonsense morality implicitly rejects the “ought implies 
can” principle, that the ordinary concept of belief allows for the possibility of voluntary 
belief-formation, that subtle misinterpretations can lead us to misunderstand the true 
meaning of our intuitive reactions to philosophical thought experiments, and that 
objections to certain theories about assertion are deeply mistaken. A series of recent 
empirical studies has also revealed the extent to which professional philosophers, just like 
ordinary people, exhibit a suite of cognitive biases affecting judgments about 
philosophically important categories. 
In light of all this, we conclude that, at least with respect to philosophy, moderate 
scientism is true. Scientific research has promoted significant progress in philosophy and 
its further development within the field should be welcomed and encouraged. 
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Philosophers often appeal to ordinary patterns of judgment and behavior. The methods 
and techniques of science have helped philosophers to accurately represent how these 
things work. In some cases, these techniques track complex relationships beyond 
anything that introspection or social observation could otherwise reasonably track. (The 
best example of this reviewed here is the work on knowledge attributions and stakes, 
which used multiple linear regression and causal modeling.) This suggests that sometimes 
scientific tools are a practical necessity when addressing certain philosophical issues.  
There is at least one noteworthy limitation to our conclusion. Nearly all of the 
research we reviewed focused on concepts central to social cognition and evaluation. 
Broadly speaking, it focused on judgments pertaining to knowledge, belief, moral 
obligations, abilities, and actions. But some areas of philosophy are not primarily 
concerned with these categories. For example, some logicians focus on the relationship of 
logical consequence and some metaphysicians focus on the ultimate basis of attribute 
agreement. It might be claimed that commonsense categories and even the entirety of 
empirical science are completely irrelevant to philosophical inquiry in these areas. We 
acknowledge that nothing we have said here casts doubt on this claim. Ultimately, such 
things are best evaluated on a case-by-case basis (for examples of such evlautions, see 
Paul Forthcoming; Ripley Forthcoming). 
We suspect that our conclusion about moderate scientism in philosophy 
generalizes to neighboring fields in the humanities. Although details will vary across 
different areas of inquiry, all responsible researchers seek accurate and detailed evidence 
for their conclusions. As the name “humanities” suggests, humanities research essentially 
involves human perceptions, reactions, and evaluations of worldly affairs. We deny that 
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science is essential to all knowledge and evidence (see the Introduction), and we do not 
believe that all phases of humanistic scholarship must be modeled after science. 
Nevertheless, social and cognitive science provide excellent tools for collecting, 
analyzing, and interpreting human perceptions, reactions, and evaluations. Thus, we 
expect that the benefits of philosophical science will be reflected in other areas of the 
humanities. 
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